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I Introduction
In this article we ask what type of equilibrium behaviour results in a multi-stage game in which the players are able to in ‡uence the probability of breakdown ("default") after each stage by their own actions in that stage. This type of game corresponds to many interesting economic environments. For example, think of two commercial banks that …ercely compete in the market for customer loans. It has been widely recognized in the banking literature that increased competition can undermine prudent bank behaviour. 2 The mechanism is as follows. Competition erodes bank pro…ts, lower pro…ts imply lower bank charter values, and lower charter values increase moral hazard incentives for banks to make riskier loans. With su¢ cient competition, banks may …nd it worthwhile to gamble. The induced riskiness translates into higher default probabilities, or -in more gametheoretic terms -into lower continuation probabilities to reach the next time period. In e¤ect, this simple mechanism implies that the banks' risky actions over time have endogenized the discount factor. In such a dynamic framework with endogenous discounting, it is not at all trivial what type of equilibrium behaviour will result. In this article we characterize and analyze a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic game with endogenous discounting from a game-theoretic perspective.
Our starting point is a two-player, multi-stage game with an in…nite horizon in which the players face the same 'stage'game in every period, and the players'overall payo¤ is a discounted sum of the payo¤s in every stage. We assume that the probability of reaching the next stage is determined by the players'actions in the current stage. Hence, in this game the discount factor of the players is endogenous, which e¤ectively implies that current play has a direct impact on future per-period attainable payo¤s. It is this particular feature that distinguishes our multi-stage game from the usual repeated game. Repeated games do not allow any in ‡uence of past and current play on future feasible actions or payo¤ functions. The 'physical environment'of our game is changing while that of a repeated game is memoryless. As a consequence, it is no longer the case that playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period constitutes a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting.
Dynamic games with in…nitely many stages in complex environments generally feature a continuum of equilibria. The usual equilibrium concept to be used in such settings is the Markov perfect equilibrium, but these equilibria are typically hard to characterize. 3 Instead, we will take a simpler route. We will focus on a stationary equilibrium in which the players are myopic. Myopic play describes a situation in which the players take the future strategies of their opponents as given, irrespective of the actual history of the game. Therefore, as players do not perceive any in ‡uence on subsequent play, the 'continuation value'of the game is …xed. This allows an intuitive and easy derivation of equilibria. We …nd that the myopic equilibrium actions of the in…nite-horizon multistage game are equal to the Nash equilibrium actions of some induced (one-shot) 'limit'game. The myopic equilibrium of the in…nite-horizon multi-stage game corresponds to the in…nite repetition of a Nash equilibrium of this limit game. In this sense, for the derivation of a stationary equilibrium, it is as though the limit game takes over the role of the stage game in a repeated game, but now corrected for the endogenous impact of the discount factor on the per-period payo¤s.
We also ask whether this myopic equilibrium has any intuitive appeal. Interestingly, the stationary myopic equilibrium is singled out when studying limiting equilibria of the multi-stage game with a …nite horizon. In particular, we show that if the number of stages in the …nite-horizon multistage game tends to in…nity, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium actions in (almost) every stage become arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium actions of the limit game. The myopic equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the in…nitely many equilibria that survives this equilibrium selection mechanism. We argue that this selection is interesting and makes good sense. It is what happens if players for some reasons are not able to coordinate on a good equilibrium. We may say that playing a Nash equilibrium of the limit game in every period in a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting is the perfect analog of playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period in a repeated game.
The setup of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section de…nes the multi-stage game with in…nitely many stages, in which the discount factor is endogenized. In section III, we derive the stationary myopic equilibrium. The equilibrium selection mechanism is described in section IV. Section V describes an illustrative example, and the last section concludes.
II De…ning the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting
An important building block of our dynamic multi-stage game, which we dub G, is the stage game, say g, which is played in every period t, t 0. Assume that the stage game is a (symmetric) two-player simultaneous move-game with …nite action spaces A i , i = 1; 2, and stage game payo¤ functions i : A ! R, i = 1; 2, where A = A 1 A 2 . The nonempty set of Nash equilibrium actions of the stage game g is denoted by A N (g) A. 4 For simplicity, we assume that the stage game g has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure actions a N with corresponding payo¤s N = (a N ). We will discuss this uniqueness restriction later on.
The players'overall payo¤ is a discounted sum of the payo¤s in every stage. In our multi-stage game G, the discount factor represents a combination of the players'exogenous rate of time preference and an endogenous continuation probability. 5 As long as the game continues, the players'current actions determine the common probability to reach the next stage, denoted by p t = p(a t ), with p t 2 [0; 1] and a t 2 A. In particular, assuming a common rate of time preference r > 0 for both players, then for t 1 we may write the discount factor as
with 0 t < 1 for t 1, and 0 = 1. Hence, note that the discount factor that discounts the next period's payo¤s to the present time will only depend on current actions. 4 The set A N is nonempty if the strategy space Ai is a compact and convex set of an Euclidean space, and payo¤ function i(a) is continuous and quasi-concave on Ai.
5 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a similar interpretation of the discount factor. They show that in…nitely repeated games can represent games that terminate in …nite time with probability one. Key is that the conditional probability of reaching the next period is bounded away from zero. Also, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) analyze a bargaining model that combines risk of breakdown and time preference as driving forces to reach an agreement quickly.
To de…ne the dynamic game, we must specify the players'strategy spaces and payo¤ functions. We assume that the players observe the realized actions at the end of each period. We start the game at t = 0, with H 0 the set of 'null'histories preceding t = 0, indicating that nothing has happened before t = 0. Denoting A t = A A the t-fold multiplication of A, then for t 1, let history h t 2 A t h t = (a 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a t 1 ); a k 2 A; 0 k t 1
be the realized choices of actions at all periods before t, and let H t be the set of all possible period-t histories. The set H of all possible histories of the game G can be represented by the in…nite union of the sets of all possible period-t histories. That is, we de…ne
Strategies for the players are rules telling the players how to move at each stage for each possible history up to that stage. Since both players observe h t , a (pure) strategy i for player i in the dynamic game is a sequence of maps t i -one for each period t -that map possible period-t histories h t 2 H t to actions a it 2 A i . Formally, for i = 1; 2,
The set of all such strategies is i , and = 1 2 .
Any strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 uniquely determines an outcome of the game that is valued by the players. We assume that both players maximize their (expected) present value
where ( (h 0 )) = 0 = 1.
Finally, if i 2 i and h t 2 H t , then it -the continuation of i after h t -is the strategy de…ned by
where (h t ; h jt ) 2 H is the history h t followed by history h jt (with appropriate conventions for histories of length 0). The corresponding continuation value of the game from stage t onward is given by
where
III Equilibrium analysis
In this section we will characterize a stationary myopic equilibrium of the multi-stage game, in which the discount factor is endogenized. But before we do so, we …rst turn to the case where the discount factor is exogenously given.
A. Equilibrium with an exogenous discount factor
The case of an exogenous discount factor takes us back to the familiar repeated games framework, in which the players play the stage game in every period. We are interested in a stationary equilibrium, where actions do not change over time. So, the corresponding strategy pro…le prescribes i (h) = a, a 2 A, for every history h 2 H. For a …xed discount factor (a t ) = for all a t 2 A, player i's present value of the in…nite sequence of payo¤s reduces to
Focus on the unique Nash equilibrium a N 2 A N (g) of the stage game g. It is well known that playing the Nash equilibrium a N of the stage game g in every period t is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G under a …xed discount factor (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ). Consider the next proposition.
Proposition III.1. If a N is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game g, then the strategy pro…le N such that N (h) = a N , for every history h 2 H, induces a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G with exogenous discounting.
Under the strategy pro…le N the future play of player j is independent of how player i plays today, so his best reply is to play to maximize his current payo¤, that is, to play a N i given that player j plays his static Nash action. 6
B. Equilibrium with an endogenous discount factor
In this subsection we characterize a stationary equilibrium of the game G with an endogenous discount factor (a), a 2 A, where the players act myopically. Myopic play here means that the players do not perceive any in ‡uence of current actions on subsequent play.
We are interested in a stationary equilibrium, where actions do not change over time. Again, the corresponding strategy pro…le prescribes i (h) = a, a 2 A, for every history h 2 H. Hence, the endogenous discount factor will also be constant over time, i.e., t = (a) < 1 for all t. The present value for player i now reduces to
Imposing constant actions over time is not innocuous in our game, since current actions are able to in ‡uence next day's attainable payo¤s via the discount factor, and may therefore a¤ect equilibrium actions over time. Fixing actions in this nonstationary environment is as though the players are committed once and for all to choosing a particular action, say (a i ; a j ), at t = 0, and play this action forever after. So, even when -for whatever reason -one of the players has deviated from playing her speci…ed action a i , her opponent will still believe that in the future she will stick to her action a i again. Given the opponent's 'myopic' beliefs, in equilibrium, it is optimal for him to also stick to his action a j . However, a fully rational player j may wish to change his action in the future if player i deviates from playing a i today. Under myopic play, when calculating her …rst-order condition, player i does not take into account that player j may respond in the future. Myopic play -in the sense that players do not perceive any in ‡uence on subsequent play -allows us to derive constant equilibrium actions in the in…nite-horizon multistage game.
In particular, as we will see in the next subsection, when analyzing the corresponding …nite-horizon multistage game, subgame perfect equilibrium actions are not constant over time. They di¤er in every period, but they converge to constant actions as the number of stages tends to in…nity. These converged actions are exactly the constant myopic equilibrium actions that we want to characterize in the in…nite-horizon multistage game.
In our de…nition, the players are said to be myopic if they take the continuation value of the game as …xed. 7 Consider the next formal de…nition of myopic play.
De…nition III.2. Myopic play: the players take the continuation value of the game as given. That is, for a given 2 we assume
In our game, de…nition III.2 implies that whatever the actual history of play, the players take V E i as given from every period onward. The …rst-order conditions characterize the stationary myopic equilibrium of the game G. In particular, player i's maximization problem becomes
As V E i is taken as given, the …rst-order condition for a maximum implies
Using stationarity, we can insert equation (9) to get
which is equivalent to
Equation (13) characterizes the stationary myopic equilibrium of our game G yielding equilibrium actions a 2 A and corresponding equilibrium strategy pro…le M E i (h) = a , for every h 2 H.
Interestingly, these myopic actions of the in…nite-horizon game G are equal to the Nash equilibrium actions of a related one-shot limit game. To see this, let us now look at the one-shot game g L that is derived from the stage game g but with modi…ed payo¤ functions, given by
The limit game g L corrects the payo¤s of stage game g for the endogenous impact of the disount factor. In particular, the payo¤s of g L represent the discounted sum of the per-period payo¤s of g, discounted at a constant rate given that equilibrium actions are constant over time.
After some algebraic manipulation, the …rst-order conditions for a Nash equilibrium of g L imply that
(1 (a))
Hence, from equations (13) and (15), it is clear that Nash equilibrium actions of the limit game g L correspond one-to-one to myopic equilibrium actions a of G. That is, a 2 A N (g L ). Consider the next proposition.
Proposition III.3. If a is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game g L , then the strategy pro…le M E such that M E (h) = a , for every history h 2 H, induces a stationary myopic equilibrium of the game G with endogenous discounting.
So, to calculate the myopic equilibrium actions of the in…nite game it is su¢ cient to derive the Nash equilibria of the limit game. From comparing proposition III.1 with proposition III.3, we can say that playing a Nash equilibrium of the limit game in every period of the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting is the perfect analog of playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period of the repeated game with exogenous discounting.
IV Finite horizon and equilibrium selection
Dynamic games often show a continuum of equilibria. In this section we argue that our stationary myopic equilibrium survives if we consider limiting subgame perfect equilibria of the …nite horizon dynamic game G T by letting T ! 1.
The …nite horizon game G T is de…ned in the same way as G but restricted to T + 1 stages in which the stage game g is played, t running from 0 to T . The game G T has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which can be found by backward induction.
Consider the game G T . Obviously, in the very last stage T , the unique Nash equilibrium actions a N T = a N of the stage game g are played, so that a N T 2 A N (g) with equilibrium payo¤s T i = i (a N T ), i = 1; 2. In the penultimate stage T 1, both players correctly anticipate that Nash equilibrium actions a N T will be played in the next period. However, by their actions a T 1 in stage T 1 they are able to in ‡uence the last period's discount factor via T = (a T 1 ). In fact, since the period T outcome is known in advance in stage T 1, it will be subgame perfect to play Nash equilibrium actions a N T 1 of a modi…ed stage game g T 1 with payo¤ functions
Hence, a N T 1 2 A N (g T 1 ). Clearly, a N T 1 6 = a N T , since the discount factor is endogenous. Similarly, in stage t, t < T , as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, the players will play Nash equilibrium actions a N t of the modi…ed stage game g t with payo¤ functions
By backward induction this process goes on until we reach the very …rst stage 0, yielding Nash equilibrium actions a N 0 of the modi…ed stage game g 0 . That is, a N 0 2 A N (g 0 ). 8 In this way, backward induction allows us to construct a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the …nite horizon game G T . This subgame perfect equilibrium induces an outcome path of Nash equlibrium actions fa N 0 ; a N 1 ; ; a N T g.
We are interested what happens to the period-t Nash equilibrium actions a N t , t = 0; : : : ; T , as the number of periods of the …nite-horizon game G T gets large. We will show that if some stability condition is satis…ed, period-t Nash equilibrium actions a N t converge to the Nash equilibrium actions a of the limit game g L . Hence, the myopic equilibrium of the in…nite-horizon game is the sole survivor when analyzing subgame perfect equilibria of the …nite-horizon game in the limit. This is the message of our main result.
The proof of proposition IV.1 centers around the modi…ed stage game. Let us take a closer look at the modi…ed stage game g k with payo¤ functions
where parameter k plays the role of future equilibrium pro…ts. Denote the corresponding Nash equilibrium actions of g k by a N (k) 2 A N (g k ), and de…ne mapping z(k) as follows:
In fact, the iteration process k s+1 = z(k s ), for s = 0; : : : ; T , describes the evolution of the period-(T s) Nash equilibrium actions and payo¤s of G T over time. In particular, starting with k 0 = 0, in the …rst round (s = 0) we have
and so on until we arrive at a N (k T ) = a N 0 . We are looking for a …xed point k = z(k ) that is asymptotically stable, and inducing a N (k ) = a . First, for a …xed point k of z(k) it must hold that
or, equivalently,
Hence, at k = k , the Nash equilibrium actions a N (k ) of the modi…ed game g k correspond to the Nash equilibrium actions of the game with payo¤ functions i (a)=(1 (a)), which is exactly the limit game g L . Therefore, k = L i (a ) and a N (k ) = a .
Second, to check asymptotic stability, let us look at the derivative dz(k)=dk; that is,
8 Note that as an initial condition in the recursion we set g T = g.
Note that @ k i =@k = . By the envelope theorem the …rst term drops out, leaving
After some straightforward manipulations, we …nd
For asymptotic stability, we need jdz(k)=dkj 1. Let us write dz(
, where
Then, for the …xed point k of z(k) to be asymptotically stable, the following condition must hold
Since 0 (a ) < 1, condition (26) holds if jB(a ; k )j is su¢ ciently small; i.e., condition (26) is satis…ed if jB(a ; k )j < 1 (a ). Consider the next proposition.
Proposition IV.1. Consider the …nite horizon game G T . If stability condition (26) is satis…ed, then for every > 0 and for every 0 t < 1, there exists T > t, such that for every 0 s t we have that j N s j < .
In fact, since T ! 1 as t ! 1, from the above proposition we can easily deduce that if the number of stages of the game G T approaches in…nity, then in (almost) all periods the stage-t subgame perfect equilibrium actions a N t get arbitrarily close to the one-shot Nash equilibrium actions a of the induced limit game g L . To put it di¤erently, the subgame perfect equilibrium actions of the …nite-horizon game G T converge to the myopic equilibrium actions of the in…nite-horizon game G.
V An illustrative example
Consider two duopolists who are engaged in Bertrand competition over time. We label this in…nite-horizon game G. The stage game g is as follows. In period t, if …rms 1 and 2 choose prices p t 1 and p t 2 , respectively, the quantity that consumers demand from …rm i is
where b > 0 re ‡ects the extent to which …rm i's product is a substitute for …rm j's product. We assume that there are no …xed costs of production and that marginal costs are constant at c, where c < a, and that …rms choose their prices simultaneously in every period t. The time-t pro…ts to …rm i when it chooses the price p t i and its rival chooses the price p t j is
It is now straightforward to calculate the Nash equilibrium of the stage game g. For 0 < b < 2, the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium prices are given by
Fierce competition, driving prices down sharply, may destabilize the market as a whole and increase the risk of breakdown for the players. Thus, by the prices the …rms choose over time, they are able to in ‡uence the discount factor. To keep things analytically tractable, we assume a very simple linear scheme
where r > 0 denotes the common rate of time preference, and v 1 a scale parameter. This simple formalization tries to grasp that lower prices tend to disrupt the market. 9 We normalize a zero probability of continuation at the point where the total price p t 1 + p t 2 is equal to zero. The limit game g L has payo¤ functions
In solving for the Nash equilibrium of g L , the best reply functions are given by
Naturally, the intersection of these best reply functions gives the Nash equilibrium prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) of the limit game g L :
Note that for v ! 1 the endogenous e¤ect of discounting disappears and, hence, p i ! p N i .
Looking at the …nite-horizon game G T where Bertrand competition takes place for only T periods, we are interested in the Nash equilibrium prices of the modi…ed stage game g k with payo¤ functions
The best reply functions are
;
For k = 0 we retrieve the Nash equlibrium actions of the stage game g so that (See the Appendix for the explicit formula.) Solving for the …xed point k = z(k) gives us k , which
. To see whether it is a stable …xed point we need to check jdz(k)=dkj < 1 at k = k . Following equations (24)- (26), we derive
which, in absolute value, is smaller than 1 (p N (k)) for su¢ ciently large v. Hence, the iteration scheme k s+1 = z(k s ) is asymptotically stable and converges toward k .
To illustrate further, let us plug in the following numerical values: a = 2, b = 1, c = 1, r = 0:05, and v = 20. Given these parameter values we retrieve Nash equilibrium prices (p N 1 ; p N 2 ) = (3; 3) of the stage game g. The limit game g L yields (p 1 ; p 2 ) = (3:32; 3:32), which are the myopic equilibrium actions of the in…nite horizon game G. Note that by endogenizing the discount factor, stationary equilibrium prices rise by 10 percent. From the modi…ed stage game g k we derive
which induces iteration scheme k s+1 = z(k s ), where z(k) = 4:00 + 0:38k + 0:005k 2 :
Solving for the …xed point yields k = 6:80, and 3:32; 3:32) . Checking the stability condition gives B((3:32; 3:32); 6:80) = 0:13 < 1 ((3:32; 3:32)) = 0:67. In Figure 1 , the left panel shows the mapping z(k) and its convergence point k . 10 The right panel shows the rate of convergence toward the …xed point k and the corresponding myopic equilibrium actions (p 1 ; p 2 ). We see that convergence is fairly rapid; already after s = 10 rounds time T s equilibrium actions become very close to the myopic equilibrium actions. 1 0 In the example, the quadratic mapping z(k) = k has obviously two roots, k = 6:80 and k = 129:7. However, this last solution is not asymptotically stable, and does therefore not correspond to a myopic equilibrium. 
VI Discussion and concluding remarks
In many economic situations, agents are able to in ‡uence the probability of default by the (risky) actions they take themselves over time. But if players have a direct impact on the probability of reaching the next stage, equilibrium behaviour among these players gets more complicated. Just playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period is no longer part of a stationary subgame pefect equilibrium of the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. In this paper, we have shown that there is an intuitive way to deal with this problem.
If players are assumed to be myopic, then stationary myopic equilibrium of the in…nite-horizon multi-stage game corresponds to the in…nite repetition of a Nash equilibrium of an induced, oneshot limit game. In this sense, for the derivation of a stationary equilibrium, it is as though this limit game takes over the role of the stage game in a repeated game, but now corrected for the endogenous impact of the discount factor on the per-period payo¤s.
Interestingly, the stationary myopic equilibrium is the sole survivor when studying limiting subgame perfect equilibria of the multi-stage game with a …nite horizon. In particular, we show that if the number of stages in the …nite-horizon multi-stage game tends to in…nity, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium actions in (almost) every stage become arbitrarily close to the myopic equilibrium actions of the in…nite-horizon multi-stage game. We feel that this selection mechanism is interesting and makes good sense. It is what happens if players for some reason are not able to coordinate on a good equilibrium. We may say that playing a Nash equilibrium of the limit game in every period in a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting is the perfect analog of playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period in a repeated game.
The derived myopic equilibrium seems intuitive and the equilibrium selection mechanism is appealing. But some di¢ culties remain. First, there is the question of uniqueness of equilibria. We assumed that the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is unique. This need not be the case. However, multiplicity of equilibria poses no real problem as long as one focuses on one particular equilibrium of the stage game. It is straightforward to show that for every Nash equilibrium of the stage game, there exists a corresponding myopic equilibrium of the dynamic game with endogenous discounting.
Second, it might be the case that although the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, some of the corresponding modi…ed stage games have multiple Nash equilibria. Then, most likely, convergence towards a myopic equilibrium is lost, and in this case there seems no simple way to characterize a stationary equilibrium.
Third, we might ask what our analysis implies for the special but widely analyzed case of the stage game being a (two-by-two) bimatrix game. Interestingly, when we repeat the one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma with its unique but ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium, it can be readily shown that by making the discount factor contingent on the four possible strategies of the stage game, the players could move to the e¢ cient outcome after some time. Moreover, the di¤erences in the discount factor need only be slight to trigger this switch to an e¢ cient outcome, provided that the horizon of the game is "long" enough. However, one needs to be careful when interpretating the limit game in this bimatrix case. Evidently, the analysis gets more complicated if the bimatrix game has more than one Nash equilibrium.
In all, these above-mentioned di¢ culties open up an interesting avenue for further research, the -14 -more so since dynamic games in which players control their own breakdown probabilities seem to correspond to very natural economic phenomena.
